DAY THIRTY-TWO: Trial Against David Castillo

NOTE: I skipped Day 31 to keep on track with the day count published by COPINH who counted a short hearing about the health concerns of the lawyers and subsequent suspension as a day in court.

Last update: June 8 at 2 pm

Main Points of the Day

• Expert witness presented by the Cáceres family, Harald Waxenecker begins his presentation. Waxenecker outlines the irregular manner in which the Agua Zarca was approved in the post-2009 coup context and the illicit networks of individuals, including Castillo, in the military, state institutions, and business elite, that sought to benefit from influence peddling, corruption, irregularities in the approval process, among other points. On two occasions, the court asked Waxenecker to skip forward in his presentation, forcing him to exclude aspects of his analysis.

• The trial is convened again tomorrow at 9 am.

COPINH publishes a short summary of some of the key elements mentioned by Waxenecker.

From top left to bottom right.

“In 2009, David Castillo was in key positions in the Armed Forces and the National Electrical Energy Company (ENEE) that provided him with privileged access to information including documents about the hydroelectric project on the Gualcarque river, through Carolina Castillo, who was the President of the ENEE union.

June 3, 2010: Carolina Castillo signs a contract with Roberto Anibal Lozano, Manager of ENEE.

2010: DESA receives the Agua Zarca hydroelectric project contract in line with parallel processes carried out by Castillo in 2009. David Castillo participated in the meeting where the decision was made to grant the project to DESA.

2009: Castillo intervened to create a standard Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) establishing a parallel mechanism for companies that did not meet the technical or legal standards to be eligible to bid on a project.

2009: David Castillo was a technical assistance to ENEE’s management and intervened in ENEE decision-making and management.

In just two days (June 21 and 22, 2010), DESA obtained the Energy Generation contract, the Exploitation of National Water Resource for the Agua Zarca hydroelectric dam project contract, and the Operation for the Generation, Transmission and Commercialization of Electric Energy contract.*

*(white writing at bottom right): “The MACCIH [Anti-corruption body] and the Special Prosecutor for Indigenous Peoples have worked together … on possible inconsistencies of the state’s process to grant a concession in such a short period of time, for a hydroelectric project to a company that did not meet the budget and technical capacity to obtain it” (OEA-MACCIH, 2017: 24)

More Details

Harald Waxenecker Presents his Expert Analysis

• Titled: “Analysis of Roberto David Castillo Mejía’s position of corporate-institutional power and his involvement in the planning, coordination, and execution of Berta Cáceres’s murder”. The presentation consists of 201 Powerpoint slides and is very dense and detailed. The presentation ended on slide 123 at 5 pm as Waxenecker testifies via Zoom from Austria which is 8 hours ahead of Honduras. He requested to continue his presentation the following day.

• Structure of the presentation. Part 1: Introduction, 2: Theoretical and method framework, 3: Socio-historical conditions of the murder, 4. Roberto David Castillo Mejía’s position of power, 5. Castillo Mejia’s relationships and resources of power, 6. Conclusions

• 1. Introduction: The expert analysis analyzes Roberto David Castillo Mejía’s [RDCM] positions and relationships of power that caused him to materialize Berta Cáceres Flores’s murder in March 2016 through by: 1. Analyzing RDCM’s institutional and business relationships in the context of the adjudication and implementation of energy projects in Honduras, specifically around the Agua Zarca project, which conditioned the motive of the crime, 2. An analysis of the RDCM’s power relations that made the planning, coordination, and execution of the crime possible.

• 2. Theoretical and method framework, 2.1. Theoretical and conceptual references. Waxenecker outlines the concepts of:

  • “Politicized nature" - the appropriation of natural resources that occurs within the contradictions of power.

  • Illicit political and economic networks - relationships and interactions between multiple actors including active and retired military; state actors (ENEE, Ministry of the Environment (SERNA), Armed Forces, National Party, National Congress, mayors, etc); Business actors (Investors and DESA directives, financial institutions, international banks, etc.); criminal actors (assassins, drug trafficking, etc). A mix of these actors get together with shared or common interests. The focus of this specific case is networks which involve the appropriation of natural resources and the materialization of violence.

  • Positions and relationships of power - Within positions and relationships of power, there are sub-systems and systems of interactions which can be direct or indirect which connects individuals within the networks to people in power (social capital).

  • 2.2. Methods and data - Wexenecker used a combination of methods; data sources; company registries, and telephone data analysis.

• 3. Socio-historical conditions of the murder: Berta Cáceres was murdered in the context of the social contradictions provoked by the implementation of the Agua Zarca project. Waxenecker discusses the context of this murder, including:

  • The liberalization of the energy market in Honduras - There was an energy crisis in the 1990s which began a process of liberalization through the Sub-sector Electricity Law (Decree 158-1994) which allowed for the private generation of electricity via fossil fuels. Then in 2007, the Incentive Law for Electrical Energy Generation (Decree 70-2007) which granted higher contracts for renewable energy generation. And a reform to Decree 138-2013 which provides additional incentive ($0.03 USD) for solar energy generation; the Industrial Electrical Law (Decree 404-2013) which outlines the importation and exportation of electric energy to commercialize energy, and the distribution and transmission of the electrical system in Honduras [aka. full blown privatization]. In 2013, bank trusts were set up to four private national banks (Banco Atlántida (received two trusts), Financiera Comercial Hondureña, Banco Continental) with the purpose of resolving the “technical and financial losses” of ENEE.

  • The post-coup context - Many academics and the UN via the resolution to condemn the coup on July 1, 2009, agree that a coup took place. Quoting the Truth Commission (2012), Waxenecker outlines how the coup exacerbated historical barriers established by powerful groups to limit the possibility of developing democracy for all in Honduras. Also how the coup deepened social and political polarization. The coup was characterized by and began on-going processes (that continue today) of: a concentration of political power; distortion of the economic competitiveness; and the remilitarization and patterns of human rights violations including excessive use of force, criminalization, selective repression, and the disfunction of the judicial system. The coup leads to the following contextual factors and characteristics:

    • Changes in the Honduran electrical sector - the post-coup national circumstances influence the complex composition of economic, political and military power that reduces competitiveness and politicizes the sector and also, assists in the formation of illicit networks. The reduced competitiveness are caused by tax rates, criminality, government inefficiency, corruption and political instability.

    • Remilitarization and patterns of human rights violations - the clear transgression of the separation of civil and military duties influenced by the strengthening of the power of the military. New laws were approved that permitted the militarization of public security including: Military Amnesty (2-2010); Constitutional reform to Article 274 (233-2011); Creation of the TIGRES police force (103-2013); Creation of the Military Police (168-2013), and others.

  • The deformation of the Honduran electrical sector - The energy sector followed an international tendency to increase investments to renewable energy projects. This occurs in the context of the international tendency for offshore production and the externalization of socio-environmental impacts. This allows for an “absolute disassociation” between economic growth and the environmental impact of projects. There is an influx of investment towards energy projects. Some focussed on the reduction of C02 emissions which provokes conflicts related to the appropriation of natural resources.

    • In the context of post-coup Honduras, at least 185 Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) contracts were signed by ENEE between 2010 and 2014 growing from contracts with 59 companies for a total of 789.8 MW of energy in 2010 to contracts with 100 companies for a total of 2,043.5 MW in 2014 (source: TSC, 2018).

    • Of the contracts granted in 2010 (including the contract to DESA), 26 companies did not fulfill their contractual clauses and despite this, they were not rejected by ENEE. In 2010, via 043-2010, DESA was granted the contract for the Agua Zarca dam. Individuals involved in the contract process are being investigated for fraud, abuse of authority, mismanagement, falsification of documents, etc.

[NOTE: Around this moment of the presentation, the court interrupts Waxenecker and asks him to skip forward to the parts about the planning and coordination of the murder. Waxenecker briefly skips through a series of slides to accommodate the court’s request]

• ENEE signed contracts with 23 companies in January 2014 despite 21 of those companies not fulfilling the established requirements to bid for state contracts. One of these companies is PRODERSSA [linked to David Castillo].

• Many of these contracts with ENEE in the context described above caused the ENEE’s economic situation to worsen. In 2017, the ENEE calculated a loss of 4,548.8 million Lempiras, 16% higher than in 2016 for a total accumulated deficit of 51,941.5 million Lempiras.

4. David Castillo’s Position of Power: This is broken into: 4.1 A parallel contract model: 043-2010, 4.2: DESA: A history in stages: Stage one (May 2009 to January 2010); Stage two (Jan 2010 to June 2010); stage three (June to October 2011); stage four (2012 to present); the network around PRODERSSA.

• 4.1 A Parallel Contract Model: 043-2010 - Context 2009-2010: Coup d’état and international public bidding process for renewable energy (No. 100-1293-2009). In this context: Since 2006, David Castillo had worked in the Armed Forces. In May 2008, he was assigned to the ENEE in the position, Coordinator of Management Control. He received two salaries - one from the Armed Forces and the other from ENEE. He was promoted in 2006, then given the position in ENEE in 2008, and then he was demoted on December 1, 2011. In the time he worked in ENEE, he worked with Carolina Lizeth Castillo Argueta, President of the ENEE union.

  • In 2009, DESA presented a bidding offer but was disqualified on December 18, 2009. Following this, Castillo intervened to develop a Power Purchasing Agreement “standard model” paralleling the bidding process.

  • The bidding process No. 100-1293-2009 was approved under the governments of Roberto Micheletti Bain and Porfirio Lobo Sosa. Despite being disqualified and being declared as inadmissible, the ENEE authorized the inscription of renewable energy contracts for the perviously disqualified companies.

  • DESA was favored in this process. On June 2, 2010, David Castillo participated in the ENEE board meeting (session 1079-2010). The contract between DESA and ENEE was signed on June 3, 2010.

  • According to the MACCIH [anticorruption body], there is sufficient evidence that “ … correspond to the existence of collusion between public officials and outsiders … [..] that favored DESA in an undue manner.…”

• 4.2.1 First stage (May 2009 to January 2010)

  • May 20, 2009: DESA filed it’s paperwork and was formally created

  • November 20, 2009: DESA named Carolina Castillo Argueta as a special representative to participate in the bidding process.

  • January 21, 2010: DESA receives an operations contract.

  • Jan 22, 2010: DESA receives a contract for the Agua Zarca project

  • Jan 22, 2010: DESA receives an operations contract

• 4.2.2. Second stage (Jan 2010 to June 2011)

  • June 3, 2010: DESA signs a contract with ENEE

  • June 22, 2010: DESA names new board members. Carolina Castillo maintains her position as a legal representative.

  • Oct 26, 2010: National Congress approves PPA contracts including the contract between ENEE and DESA

  • Nov 23, 2010: PEMSA [another company affiliated with David Castillo] registers as a company in Panamá

  • March 24, 2011: SERNA grants the environmental license to the Agua Zarca project noting that DESA had to present a document outlining the community consultation and consent for the project.

  • March 25, 2011: SERNA signs off on the environmental license to DESA

  • June 14, 2011: Various state institutions sign a “support agreement” with DESA for the hydroelectric project.

  • August 30, 2012: the National Congress approved 24 agreements which were published on January 26, 2013. This was a critical part of the Agua Zarca project because the PPA contract was formalized, approved by Congress, the construction, operations and environmental license was granted, and a support agreement signed with state institutions and DESA.

  • August 2, 2011: In an investors meeting, an investment was approved for 563,902.76 Lempiras. Up to that moment, DESA’s start up capital was only 25,000 Lempiras. A total of 598,283.39 was approved to carry out an environmental impact study. In addition, debts to be paid to Digital Communications (DIGICOM) and other companies were approved. DIGICOM is owned by David Castillo.

• 4.2.3 Third stage (June to October 2011)

  • June 14, 2011: DESA’s value was listed at a maximum of 4 million Lempiras and a minimum of 1 million Lempiras. The investors were listed as PEMSA represented by Roberto Pacheco Reyes [ex-Minister of Government during Ricardo Maduro government 2002-2006), and Jorge Coreo Lobo.

  • June 21, 2011: Meetings were held in some villages in Rio Blanco. Former mayor Martiniano Domínguez and community representatives participated. David Castillo was also present despite not having a formal position in the company.

    Presentation ended for the day. To be continued when the expert witness is called again

DAY THIRTY: Trial Against David Castillo

Main Points of the Day

• The trial was held for a few hours today. Castillo’s defense attorneys attempted to recuse the private accusers’s expert witness Harald Waxenecker because of previous publications Waxenecker had made about Honduras. After a few hours of debate, the court rejected the defense’s motion.

• The trial will convene on Monday, June 7 at 9:00 am.

DAY TWENTY-NINE: Trial Against David Castillo

NOTE: The court convened briefly today (Thursday, June 3) to discuss the health concerns of two attorneys representing the Cáceres family. The judges are waiting for covid results to make decisions about when the trial will convene again.

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NOTE: Today, Wednesday, June 2nd, the trial did not take place as planned because of a health concern raised by the private accusers (Cáceres family lawyers). It is convened again for tomorrow at 9 am.

Last update (for notes below): June 2 at 9:15 pm

Main Points of the Day

• Expert witness Gladys Tzul spent the day on the stand being questioned mostly by Castillo’s defense team. Tzul finished her appearance in court. The trial will continue on Wednesday

More Details

Expert Witness Gladys Tzul Continues on the Stand

• The court verifies the judicial files that were given to Tzul to complete her expert analysis after a question from the prosecutors from day twenty-eight.

• Private Accusers (Cáceres family lawyers) Question Tzul

  • Q: How much time did you have to conduct your analysis from the time you received the information from the court? A: 7 days

  • Q: In what year did you conduct the interviews used in your analysis? A: In 2017

  • Q: In conclusion #4 you made reference to ‘sacred notions’, what are you referring to? A: These sacred notions are part of the cosmovision of the Lenca people who believe that the river has a feminine spirit and is cared for by [the spirit of] girls. This belief is politically and socially fundamental to the communities. This is what I was told in interviews.

  • Q: You mentioned the campaigns to discredit Berta Cáceres. What did these campaigns entail? A: They were used against Berta Cáceres for being COPINH’s coordinator. They accused her of being against development because defending communal concepts in a liberal political framework means that one is against development. Even though communities may not have economic income, they have richness through their water, land, and territories.

• Castillo’s Defense Team Questions Tzul.

  • [NOTE: The questioning begins with the technical consultant Edgardo Rodríguez. Rodríguez is a controversial figure as he resigned from his university teaching position after it was reported that he called his students “little gay boys” (mariconcitas) and “little girls (niñitas). In this trial, the court equated his credentials as a technical consultant to the credentials of Gladys Tzul, a gender violence expert. For several hours, the defense asked several detailed questions, many of them were objected to by the prosecutors and private accusers. It seemed like there were more questions that received objections than there were questions that were answered.]

  • Q: You talked about military occupation in Lenca territories, how do you define military occupation? A: The entrance and presence of the Armed Forces

  • Q: What is your role inside the indigenous movement? A: I’m a social, community-oriented researcher.

  • Q: On page 2 of your analysis, you said that the report reviews and analyzes specific theories. What relationship do these academic discussions have with concrete facts? Objection

  • Q: You said you interviewed people from Intibuca. How many people did you interview? A: I did two field work visits. In the first, I spoke with 36 people and the second, 22 people

  • Q: What percentage of the population do the 36 and 22 people represent? A: There is no perception of universality in my analysis

  • Q: What level of knowledge do you have of the demographic composition of Honduras? Objection

  • Q: What is the Lenca population in Honduras? A: I understand that you’re looking for a quantitative analysis. This is a qualitative analysis. Secondly, the state registry of these numbers do not record self-identification of indigenous identity and there are processes of self-identification inside communities. This limits the ability to know really know about indigenous populations. That’s why I don’t use it because it can be an obstacle.

  • Q: Why did you say that 91% of the Honduran population is rural? A: I got this figure from the Honduran Institute of Anthropology and History from a specific academic study.

  • Q: [Technical consultant reads a DESA communique talking about Lenca communities being manipulated.] Why did you say in this study that this is a racist policy? A: It says that Berta Cáceres is manipulating the communities. This communique indicates that indigenous populations can be manipulated and they don’t have the ability to analyze and understand their situation on their own.

  • Q: How do you identify ideologically? Objection

  • Q: You said that Berta was anti-capitalist, if we are talking about capitalism, what ideology do you identify with? Objection

  • Q: You mentioned the Popular Women’s courts that COPINH organized, what level of recognition or legitimacy do these courts have by the Honduran state? A: These courts are a part of historical processes inside communities. They have been conserved as has the capacity to make justice.

  • Q: You refer to political registries, are you referring to the political system? A: There are liberal state framework (such as insitutions that make up the state) and another type of registry from a different type of political system which is communal. The individual is not at the center of this second type and instead, the community is. They establish a knowledge about territory, water, etc.

  • Q: What is your position about hydroelectric projects? A: I presented my conclusions, I don’t have a position. I’m not Honduran

  • Q: You said that Castillo tried to be Cáceres’s friend, offered her favors - how can you conclude as as sociologist that there is gender violence in the short conversation you referenced? A: These are evaluations that I made from various parts of conversations. I listed the ways in which acts and behaviors are identified as gender violence against women.

  • Q: You talked about friendship not being able to exist in situations of inequality. How is this possible if we all have friendships with people that are from different cultures, different economic backgrounds, etc? Objection (she answered). There is always a relation of power in these types of relationships (ex. teacher and a student).

  • The defense lawyers take over the questioning

  • Q: In your analysis about Berta Cáceres, what relevance did you give to topics that we are discussing today? Objection

  • Q: Why in your analysis did you use the research of the GAIPE as a central resource? Objection

  • Q: In your analysis, what do men represent in the social realm? Objection

  • Q: Why did you take the data about murders of women from 2013 and not the range from 2013 to 2017? [inaudible]

  • Q: What was the murder rate of women in 2013 to 2017? I don’t have that information

  • Q: What knowledge do you have of the population demographics in Intibuca? Objection

  • Q: How many communities are there in Rio Blanco? Objection

  • Q: When you were in La Esperanza, what importance did you give to the relationship between communities in Santa Barbara with respect to COPINH’s actions? A: I studied violence against women

  • Q: You used charts to describe chats between different people, on chart xyz (names specific chart), what types of chats are they? A: They are group chats

  • There were more questions but many were objected to and many are largely irrelevant.

DAY TWENTY-EIGHT: Trial Against David Castillo

Last update: May 30 at 2:45 pm

Main Points of the Day

• Expert witness Gladys Tzul continued on the stand. Prosecutors will continue questioning her tomorrow at 1:30 when the trial is convened again.

DAY TWENTY-SEVEN: Trial Against David Castillo

Last update: May 30 at 4:15 pm

Main Points of the Day

• Witness Indyra María Mendoza Aguilar from the organization Cattrachas was called by the attorneys representing the Cáceres family to testify. As someone who monitored and reported to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights about threats against and security incidents experienced Berta Cáceres, Mendoza provided a comprehensive overview of these concerns including meeting David Castillo, being told by Berta not to trust him, and testifying that DESA played a large role in Berta’s difficult security situation in and post-2013.

• The defense proposes controversial Honduran teacher Edgardo Rodríguez, as a technical consultant to question expert witness Gladys Tzul who began presenting her analysis: “Situation and Condition of Violence Experienced by Indigenous Women and Women Human Rights Defenders: The case of Berta Cáceres and the defense of the Gualcarque river”

• Expert witness Tzul uses sociological theories and various chat messages presented as evidence in the case to describe gender-based violence that occurred between Castillo and Cáceres; and Castillo and DESA’s mechanisms of control over Berta as an indigenous, female, human rights defender, among others. Tzul also discussed the complex means in which control over women’s bodies and subjugation are necessary in order to achieve control over communal territories.

More Details

Indrya María Mendoza Aguilar, Human Rights Defender from Organization Cattrachas Testifies

• [NOTE: It was extremely difficult to write the details of this testimony as the witness spoke very fast. There are many details that are missing from these notes]

• Mendoza started by giving a declaration describing the work she did at monitoring and documenting threats against Berta Cáceres’s life as a result of her work as a human rights defender, and particularly the work she did with COPINH in Rio Blanco from 2014 to 2016. In 2013, Cattrachas started to follow the actions that COPINH was carrying out in Rio Blanco, particularly the murder of Tomas Garcia. And then from there, the criminalization process and hate campaigns against Berta. Mendoza also did follow up on the implementation and monitoring of Berta’s IACHR precautionary measures. She met David Castillo on July 3, 2014 during a celebration at the US Embassy. Cattrachas was invited because the policies of the US Embassy at the time were pro-LGBTI. In the line waiting to sign the attendance list, David Castillo said to her: “I’m from DESA.” Mendoza asked him what he was doing there. Castillo responded: “I’m not the bad guy” and gave her his business card. The following day, Berta wrote her asked Mendoza if she had been at the Embassy. Berta said she found out through Castillo and she would explain why she’s in touch with him later. Then Mendoza received an email from Castillo saying “it was a pleasure to meet you” and she thought that was unusual considering the exchange they had had. Mendoza also describes a meeting that was coordinated to occur in Cattrachas office in Tegucigalpa between Cáceres and Castillo. When asked why she was meeting him, Berta told Mendoza it was because he gave her information but warned her not to trust him.

• The Private Accusers Question Mendoza:

  • [NOTE: The witness’s answers were more extensive than represented here. It was difficult to note a lot of the details because of the speed of Mendoza’s answers]

  • Q: What was your relationship with Berta Cáceres? A: We were compañeras de lucha [comrades in the struggle]

  • Q: What was Berta’s role in the Agua Zarca struggle? A: From 2006 and on, COPINH, which Berta was part of, had a mission to protect their territories for everyone. This was COPINH’s mission

  • Q: What consequences did Berta and COPINH face as a result of the defense of their territories? They suffered more direct attacks when DESA began operating in Rio Blanco

  • Q: You have a registry and monitored the threats against Berta, what were the risks she faced? She faced a lot of risk that came from many places - private industry, and the press being some

  • Q: In your documentation, who was putting Berta and COPINH at risk? A: The Madrid family, DESA, Sergio, Bustillo and people from the community, almost all of them had the last name Madrid.

  • Q: You did a risk analysis, what is that? A: To identify patterns and help identify real risks.

  • Q: You talked about declarations made in the news, who made them? A: I don’t have all the information and names now. People from the private lobby, like Elsia Paz, and others.

  • Q: How did the criminalization against Berta start in 2013? A: The threats against Berta were not the same types as threats prior to 2013. It wasn’t just threats but also actions against COPINH. The criminalization started by accusing Berta of having an illegal weapon that didn’t exist. This diverted their energy from defending their territory to defending themselves against these attacks.

  • Q: What security measures did Berta have and how were they implemented? A: In the beginning she was given a phone number to call, the number of the Ministry of Security, a person named Sagrario Purdott.

  • Q: What would Purdott do when there were security problems? A: She would say that police would be sent.

  • Q: How did you find out about Berta’s murder? A: They called me at 3 am. I immediately made calls and contacted people like Karla Cueva [Minister of Human Rights]

• The Prosecutors Question Mendoza:

  • Q: You said that Berta Cáceres was a land defender. What else did she do? A: She and COPINH accompanied struggles all over the country, in Zacate Grande, Cortés … it wasn’t just about the Gualcarque river

  • Q: What were the threats at the project site in Rio Blanco? A: Security guards, military, police and then people from the community that worked with DESA or sold their land to the company

  • Q: What other companies were there? A: DESA and others but mostly DESA

  • Q: You said that in 2009, Berta Cáceres received precautionary measures from the IACHR, why? A: She received them for defending democracy in the context of the coup

  • Q: How many precautionary measures were given to her? A: She always had measures and we informed the commission throughout the years about security risks.

  • Q: When was the last time Berta went to Agua Zarca? A: I don’t know

  • Q: How did Berta send you details about the threats against her? A: Through email

• The Defense Questions Mendoza

  • Q: You were very informed about Berta, what other types of projects did Berta influence? A: Berta and COPINH were involved in the defense of various territories like Zacate Grande, Palmerola, and Cortés amongst others

  • Q: What communication did you have with Berta about threats in the area related to mining? A: I collected information about the risks .. [rest of answer was hard to catch]

  • Q: According to your personal relationship and your analysis of press reports, how was Berta’s relationship with mayors in the areas where COPINH was present? A: I don’t know. There were a lot of mayors that would talk against COPINH

  • Q: How many communities are in Rio Blanco? A: I don’t know … El Barreal … I don’t remember

  • Q: How many times did you visit the zone, the project? A: My role was outside of the conflict area

  • Q: How many communities are part of COPINH? A: I dkno’t know

  • Q: What is COPINH’s support or social proposals in the communities where they work? A: They defend life and their territories

  • Q: How do the communities react with actions taken by COPINH? Was there democracy about COPINH’s presence in communities? A: It wasn’t an issue of democracy, if the communities decide to defend their river, like the Gualcarque river which they did starting in 2006, then it’s a human right, it’s not about democracy

  • Q: What community was Berta from? A: She was from La Esperanza but she was a human rights defender.

  • Q: What was the reaction of the communities with respect to the money that Berta won? A: The award was about the recognition of her work, it wasn’t about money. I don’t know.

  • Q: In the communication with Berta, did she say what issues the communities have about the money? A: No

  • Q: Do you know how frequently Cáceres and Castillo met? A: No

  • Q: Do you know when David picked Berta up from the hotel where she was staying? A: No, I don’t know

  • Q: What did you know about the relationship between Berta and Aureliano Molina? A: They were compañeros de lucha. They had a personal relationship

  • Q: When you said that you saw David Castillo at the Embassy, you said that he was “the most hated”, why? A: Because they had just assassinated Tomas and DESA was responsible and there were threats against COPINH

  • Q: You said that DESA was responsible, who was responsible? A: It was the military [that killed Tomas Garcia] and DESA called them and the police.

Defense Presents Technical Consultant to Assist Their Questioning of Expert Witness Harald Waxenecker

• The private accuser’s expert witness Harald Waxenecker briefly joined the trial via Zoom. As he is based in Europe with a significant time difference, he requested to change his presentation to the following day at a more appropriate time. His presentation will last between approximately 3 to 4 hours and is titled: “Analysis of Roberto David Castillo Mejía’s position of corporate-institutional power and his involvement in the planning, coordination, and execution of Berta Cáceres’s murder.” The court granted this request.

• The defense presents a technical consultant to assist the defense in questioning Waxenecker. Given the difference in the consultant’s credentials in comparison to Waxenecker, the court rejects the technical consultant.

Testimony of Witness Melissa Cardoza Must Take Place in Front of Honduran Consulate in Mexico

• A witness presented by the private accusers, Melissa Cardoza, briefly joins the trial from Mexico via Zoom. As a result of an emergency trip, Cardoza is unable to appear before the court in person to testify.

• The court rules that they will accept Cardoza’s testimony but only if it’s given in the presence of the Honduran Consulate in Mexico City. This would ensure that the testimony is spontaneous. The private accusers and the court commit to making this request to the Consulate and for Cardoza to appear via Zoom at another date.

Expert Witness Gladys Tzul On Violence and Gender

• Tzul begins by outlining the objectives of her analysis: 1. Study the situation of violence suffered by women that defend the Gualcarque river and in particular, the case of Berta Cáceres, 2. Analyze the correlation between violence against Berta Cáceres and the presence of DESA, 3. Examine the effects of female leadership in indigenous communities and the consequences of gender-based violence against Berta Cáceres that ultimately led to her murder.

• Tzul outlines the theoretical and methodological frameworks and scholars used in her analysis including sociology, oral histories, and the judicial files provided to her.

• Tzul drew ten conclusions:

  • 1. Berta Cáceres was a woman, Lenca, political leader and general coordinator of the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras. COPINH collectively produce and politically coordinate a process of communal defense of the Gualcarque river, together with the communities of women, men, children, elderly, who together, articulated a communal and pan-indigenous defense of water, land, and communal living.

  • 2. The subjugation and control of women’s bodies are necessary to allow for the devastation of communal territories. This is understand in a broad manner in the harassment campaigns against Lenca women in their defense of the Gualcarque river. In the case of Berta Cáceres, persecution, monitoring, harassment triggered her murder. The murder of women plays a specific role of terrorizing the communities.

  • 3. The communal struggles of Lenca women are repressed with diverse mechanisms of violence and discipline - the use of force, discrediting, and death is used to achieve the imposition of capitalist investment on communal lands. Because of this, Berta Cáceres’s murder must be understood as a territorial femicide

  • 4. Colonization, sexism and racism work not only in the economic realm but also in symbolic material ways when they liquidate bodies, feelings, and knowledge. This is explained under a business model which contradicts the communal resolutions that determine the communal nature of the territory in Rio Blanco. In the same way, the sacred notions about destiny, origins, and life of the Gualcarque river demonstrate a clear tension with a business model that seeks to name the river as a water resource - exploitable.

  • 5. Lenca women have generated political mechanisms to confront physical, sexual and psychological violence. In this context, the Popular Women’s Courts that Berta Cáceres created and supported can be understood. These courts helped with communal struggles and put the problems of violence and harassment as central topics to be dealt with. Berta Cáceres was well-versed in the mechanisms of violence against women

  • 6. The masculine business class, the state, and corporations attack, try to discredit, and harass feminine leadership by defaming and criticizing their status as women in front of their family and their community. This is done by persecuting, harassing, and monitoring them. They use violent and docile mechanisms and strategies in order to dominate women in leadership positions. When this is not achieved, they are murdered.

    • Tzul presents several chat between Cáceres and Castillo to demonstrate this. One chat outlines how Cáceres reaffirms her struggle as a leader of COPINH as Castillo complains about her organizing.

  • 7. One can see evidence of the state and corporate alliance that DESA used to monitor Berta Cáceres's actions as a leader. She is identified and observed. Both promoted legal complains against her as a person that had influence in the community and that opposed the construction of the Agua Zarca dam.

    • Tzul uses another chat between Cáceres and Castillo to show this

  • 8. Berta Cáceres as a defender of life - which was revealed in the way she acted and in her work as COPINH’s coordinator, along with Lenca communities - sought to maintain control and take care of communal territories and their means of life. Her work as a leader achieved the combination of defending life and being critical of violence against women.

  • 9. The process in which women relate to men is always unequal. Because of this, when referring to a male business manager and a female community leader, one can name diverse layers of inequality. The friendship can only occur in unequal conditions. A male manager that seeks to exploit land cannot be friends with a community leader that defends land.

  • 10. The trajectory of gender-based violence appears in the relationship between Castillo and Cáceres. He seeks to be her friend, he offers her favors, he provides support, he monitors her with the objective of her ceding to his conditions. When he does not achieve this, he carries out actions against her as a person by criminalizing her and seeking to neutralize and eliminate her political actions as an obstacle to the economic project that he represents. These actions lead to Berta Cáceres’s murder.